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in 
statements he made during a police interrogation because they were 
impermissibly-coerced statements. The State's responds by contending Mr. Simpson 
misrepresented the relevant facts and law. However, when the proper standard of 
review is given effect, and Mr. Simpson's argument and the relevant precedent are 
properly understood, the State's attacks are revealed to be mistaken. As such, this 
Court should disregard those arguments. 
On the merits of this claim, the relevant facts and legal precedent reveal that the 
district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress the coerced-compliant 
statements elicited by the police interrogation. Therefore, this Court should reverse that 
judgment of conviction, this case further proceedings. 
statement of the facts course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Simpson's Appellant's Brief. not this Reply Brief, but 
are herein by reference thereto. 
1 
2 
cases, of is important to 
resolving the claims therein. When dealing with claims such as the one Mr. Simpson 
on the Court reviews legal conclusion - whether the statements 
were coerced, as opposed to voluntary - de novo. State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 784 
(Ct. 1992); cf Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("the ultimate issue 
of 'voluntariness' is a legal question") (internal quotation omitted). Under this standard, 
"[t]he must show a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's 
statements were voluntary." State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912 (Ct App. 2013). 
Applying that standard of review in this case, the video and transcript of the 
show the officers interrogation tactics against 
try him was not willing 
make. 1a 1b.) Whenthe ofthe isevaluated,it 
clear that those tactics were not properly employed against Mr. Simpson, and 
so, resulted in eliciting unconstitutional coerced-compliant statements. (See App. 
Br., 12-35.) Thus, on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, 
Simpson contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
coerced-complaint statements 
Br., pp.12-35.) 
from him (App. 
Rather than discuss the officers' tactics within the totality of the circumstances, 
the State takes a tangential approach in its Respondent's Brief, trying to discredit 
3 
The District Court's Order Denying His Motion To Suppress 
that Mr. - that Court's 
concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations are equally applicable in the 
interview" (App. Br., p.13) - misrepresents the precedent on this issue. 
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) As the State's argument indicates, custodial interrogations are 
different than noncustodial interviews in of the amount of coercion that exists in 
scenario. In that regard, Mr. Simpson recognizes his use of the term "equally," 
standing alone, might have been unclear. However, the State's argument fails to 
appreciate that statement within the context Mr. Simpson's full argument: that, 
concerns about improperly are in ial 
a a was voluntarily. 
(App. Br., pp.13-14.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has a totality of the circumstances test to 
whether the defendant's were voluntary or whether his will was 
overborne in noncustodial interviews with State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 400 
(1997); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993). In adopting that test, the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized that, because coercion can occur in a noncustodial 
interview, coercion should be a factor in the courts' assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances. Id. In fact, the Troy Court expressiy identified it as the first of several 
4 
a ,a 
were 1 2 1, 214 
(1993) Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 21 226 (1973)). 
Thus, while the highlights the distinction between and 
noncustodial interrogations, it misses the critical point resulting from this distinction: 
Miranda warnings are required in custodial interrogations because of the increased 
coerciveness of that situation. However, that does not mean that situations where such 
warnings are not required cannot occur still be impermissibly coercive. See, e.g., 
v. Fernandez-Torres, 337 P.3d 691, 703 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (finding statements 
have been impermissibly coerced during a noncustodial interrogation despite a 
finding that Miranda warnings had been given and the underlying right to remain silent 
United States v. 751 3d 1008, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 
during a 
impermissibly coerced). 
Troy Court's determination that 
interrogation to 
is one factor in the totality 
of the circumstances is consistent with the United State Supreme Court's discussion on 
the same topic: 
We recognize, of course, that noncustodial interrogation might possibly in 
some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, 
characterized as one where "the behavior of ... law enforcement officials 
was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about 
confession not freely self-determined .... " When such a claim is raised, it 
is the duty of an appellate court, including this Court, "to examine the 
entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue 
of voluntariness." Proof that some kind of warnings were given or that 
none were given wouid be reievant evidence oniy on the issue of whether 
the questioning was in fact coercive. 
5 
u 
1 
911 2 (recognizing both Beckwith and Troy identify coercion as a relevant in 
and explaining that, in such the 
show the defendant's statements were, in fact, voluntary). Thus, the 
concerns with do, as Mr. Simpson's entire in 
noncustodial scenario as well as the custodial scenario. 
In State's own citation to Oregon v. Elstad its - that 
Simpson's 
noncustodial setting 
concern police coercion exiting in the 
u 
as even 
be squared" with Supreme Court precedent (Resp. 
- is erroneous: '"Indeed, far from being 
if not are inherently 
damning admissions."' Br., p.6 (quoting 
305 (1 (internal omitted) 
by Constitution, 
some 
even 
v. Elstad, 470 
cited by the State demonstrate, a proper consideration when 
addressing an admission by the defendant is whether that admission was coerced. 
Thus, because can occur in either or 
Beckwith, Troy, Loosli, and other such decisions, recognize that, whether Miranda 
warnings were given, regardiess of whether they were required, remains a relevant 
factor to consider when evaluating whether the defendant's' statements were voluntary. 
Since Simpson's claim is consistent States Court and idaho 
6 
in 
on is 
merits of Mr. Simpson's claim of the contends that the 
gave adequate consideration to fact that no Miranda warnings were given. 
(Resp. Br., p.10.) However, that assertion ignores the plain language of the district 
court's statement. The district court explained, "[w]hile this Court understands that [the 
absence such warnings] could be a negative factor, Miranda did not apply because 
this was not a custodial interrogation." (R., p.116 (emphasis added).) By only 
acknowledging it "could be" a negative factor, the district court expressed its 
understanding that it might be a factor in a particular, but not every, case. The 
particular cases in which the district court believed that to be a relevant factor is 
identified district court's statement: that factor "did apply" in the absence 
a 
d 
case 
. (R., 116.) more interpretation of 
is that it did not believe that Miranda warnings were a factor in 
there was not a custodial interrogation. (See R., p.116.) In that 
case, it did not adequately consider the impact of a relevant factor within the totality of 
the circumstances of Mr. Simpson's case. Troy, 124 Idaho at 214 (expressly 
identifying "whether Miranda warnings were given" as the first of many relevant factors 
consider in this regard); Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (reaffirming that Troy factors are 
applicable in the noncustodial context). 
Since the district court was operating on an erroneous interpretation of the 
governing lega, standards, its resuiting iegal conciusion is erroneous. At any rate, the 
7 
is novo. 
no 
in 
State takes reliance on the 
decision in v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999). (See Resp. 
, pp.10-12.) First, Idaho's own case law makes several similar points to those made 
in Rettenberger when analyzing the potentially-coercive use of interrogation techinques 
within the totatlity of circumstances of a particular case. Compare State v. Kysar, 114 
Idaho 457, 459 (Ct. App. 1988) (involving a less extreme fact pattern which 
nevertheless resulted in coerced statements because the questioning unconstitutionally 
overbore the subject's will); with Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (involving a more extreme fact 
pattern which nevertheless did not overbear the subject's will). As discussed in depth in 
Appellant's Brief, this case is more like Kysar than Loosli. (App. Br., pp.17-18.) The 
no on nor it even Kysar or Loosli. 
generally Resp. Br.) In addition demonstrating the State's allegation that 
Simpson somehow misrepresented the relevant law is mistaken, the fact that 
State ignored this relevant Idaho precedent reveals that the State has failed to meet 
its burden to prove Mr. Simpson's statements 
Idaho at 911-12. 
in fact, voluntary. See Valero, 153 
Second, while, as State points out, there are some factual differences 
between Rettenberger and this case (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12), rare would be the pair 
of cases that are factually identical. As such, Idaho's courts have often examined how 
other states have handied simiiar issues, particuiariy when examining an issue not fully 
8 
or a in in a 
is 
jurisdictions."); State v. Ozuna, 155 Idaho 697, 703 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We find 
reasoning fo Massachusetts of Appeals persuasive."). 
Mr. Simpson has cited Rettenberger for those same purposes here. Despite the 
factual differences, the Rettenberger Court's discussion of the nature of the various 
interrogation techniques used in that case is still insightful, particularly its explanation of 
how and why several of those interrogation tactics, which might be innocuously used in 
some cases, are impermissilby in others. See, e.g., Fernandez-Torres, 337 
3d at 703 (expressly relying on Rettenbergefs analysis in determining the trial court 
had properly suppressed coerced-compliant statements resulting from a noncustodial 
interrogation); cf Preston, 751 1 (mirroring the Rettenberger Court's 
a noncustodial 
a suspect with a low was impermissibly coercive). Therefore, 
Rettenbergers discussion is still useful understanding and 
analyzing the issue in this case. 
Ultimately, though, applying the precedent from cases like Kysar, Loosli, and 
Troy, the district court erred in denying Simpson's motion to suppress his coerced-
statements, this Court should reverse that decision. 
9 
were on 
to be "tracking" their questions. (Resp. , pp.9-10.) Here 
it is to the governing standard of review: This reviews that 
issue de nova, deferring only to those factual findings which are not clearly erroneous 
(i.e., not supported by competent and substantial See, e.g., 
Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) ( defining the clearly erroneous 
standard); Aitken, 121 Idaho at 784 (rearticulating the standard of review for this claim). 
The issue Mr. Simpson raised on appeal is that the district court's legal conclusion -
that, Mr. Simpson was not "impermissibly confuse[d], trick[edJ, or deceive[d]" into 
making the statements in question (i.e., coerced into making the statements) (R., p.117) 
- is erroneous when the totality of 
, pp.12-35.) 
is properly . (App. 
Properly understanding the of Simpson's argument within the 
representation 
district court 
of reveals the State's on Simpson's 
Mr. Simpson did not contend, as the that the 
Dr. Lindsey's testimony. ( See Resp. , p.10.) The term 
"ignore" means "to to take notice of." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND 
THESAURUS, 403 (2007). Mr. Simpson did not contend that the district court refused to 
take notice of . Lindsey's testimony. (See generaliy App. Rather, Mr. Simpson 
contended the district court's conclusions "misconstrued" that testimony. (App. 
, p.18.) The term "misconstrue" means "to interpret wrongly." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
10 
AND 518 means COLI 
an erroneous 
mean. 
within his to the court's conclusions, Mr. Simpson 
one of factual findings necessarily inferred by that conclusion - that 
Simpson's mental health issues did not compromise ability to make voluntary 
decisions within the interrogation in this case - was not based on substantial and 
competent evidence, and so, was clearly erroneous, because it was a non sequitur. 
(App. Br., pp.18-19.) As such, Mr. Simpson is contending the district court improperly 
an inference or conclusion (that Mr. Simpson's will was not overborne due to his 
health issues) which does not logically follow from the premise (that he was 
the questions). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 490 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) 
term "non sequitur''). 
was incapable understanding the 
information very 
person," not 
.1, p.90, Ls.10-12 
(emphasis added).) As a result of this condition, Mr. Simpson was aware of, and thus, 
the question, but his ability to process the whole context of the questions, and 
so, make voluntary decisions to speak, in particular, high-pressure, fast-evolving 
situation was compromised. This resulted in him giving topical, yet "simplistic and 
almost illogical" explanations. (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.) Thus, the district court's 
1 In this context, the term "track" means being "aware[] of a fact or progression." 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 842 (2007). 
11 
underlying 
Lindsey's testimony, 
misrepresentation of the facts. 
court's 
challenge to 
his 
is borne out by the as 
inference not constitute a 
More important, though, is the impact this more-complete understanding of 
Simpson's mental health issues has on the legal conclusion of whether 
Mr. Simpson's statements were voluntary. The State does not address Mr. Simpson's 
to the district court's legal conclusion in this regard. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
If Simpson's mental health issues were, as Dr. Lindsey testified, in play during the 
interrogation, that factor indicates the situation was more coercive in the totality of the 
v. Brown, 1 Idaho 423, 430 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 
V. u 1 1 1 986)) (reaffirming a person's 
condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to "' 
is a needs be in totality of the circumstances). 
Court 
questioning 
that question. 
of voluntariness coercion in response to the 
novo, that factor can and should incorporated into its evaluation of 
To that it is important remember that State bears burden of 
proving the statements were voluntary. See, e.g., Valero, 153 Idaho at 911-12. The 
offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the nature 
and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues generally or in this speclfic 
12 
were 
Finally on this point, the State contends that Mr. Simpson has improperly argued 
this to "apply the law to the conclusions of his experts" rather than to the 
conclusions drawn by the district court. (Resp. Br., p.12.) Again, the State fails to 
appreciate the governing standard of review. Since this Court reviews the conclusion of 
voluntariness de nova, Mr. Simpson has argued that this Court should, in evaluating 
the totality of the circumstances, include the insights of the two professionals who 
offered their expert opinions about the coercive nature of the interrogation and the role 
Mr. Simpson's mental health issues played in that context. "When such a claim 
[regarding admissibility of allegedly-coerced statements] is raised, it is the duty of an 
court, including 
an 
425 U.S. 
United States Supreme] Court, 'to examine the entire 
of the 
(quoting 384 U. 
of 
741 
"'2 
, see also 
2 As the United States Supreme Court has indicated it is the duty of the appellate courts 
to "examine the entire record' to make its de nova determination of voluntariness as it 
relates to potential violations of the Fifth Amendment, Beckwith 425 U.S. at 347 
(emphasis added), this Court can consider information in the 2013 PSE and the 
PSI, as they are both part of the entire appellate record. (See R., pp.160-61 (Clerk's 
Certification of Exhibits).) Thus, it should reject the State's assertion that it should 
refuse to consider those documents. (See Resp. Br., p.12 n.1.) 
At any rate, the relevant point of the information in those documents (namely, 
Mr. Simpson's inability to adequately process the information being presented by the 
officers, and thus, make voluntary statements in response) was sufficiently presented in 
Dr. Lindsey's testimony to the district court. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.85, L.9 - p.92, L.17.) 
Therefore, this Court should still consider that factor in its de novo review of the legal 
conclusion that Mr. Simpson's statements were not coerced. 
13 
V. 1 (1 is 
circumstances, and 
determination questioning Mr. 
and extracted a coerced-compliant statement in violation of Mr. Simpson's constitutional 
rights. (See generally App. Br., pp.12-35.) Since that information is relevant to the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Simpson has properly 
that information in its determination on that matter. 
As the has offered no meritorious challenge to claims Mr. Simpson 
actually made on this appeal, and since it has ultimately failed to carry its burden to 
show that Mr. Simpson's statements were, in fact, voluntary in light of the totality of the 
the district 
is 
reverse the district 
decision to deny Mr. 
to erroneous. 
should reverse 
this Court 
motion to 
judgment 
denying his motion suppress, 
DATED this 21st day December, 2015. 
Deputy State Appeiiate 
14 
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